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The image of the lawyer that is most
commonly in the mind of the rest of the
community is that of the &dquo;mouthpiece,&dquo; the
clever advocate who can make things seem
what they are probably not and sway justice
in favor of his client (for a price). In the
international sphere, where courts have no
compulsory authority, his value is thought
to be slight.
What the popular view overlooks is the
fact that, quite as much as he is an advo-
cate, the lawyer is a specialist trained in the
task of adjusting conflicts of interest by
seeking out points of agreement and devis-
ing workable formulas for the relations of
individuals or groups based on existing bal-
ances of power and interest.
In international relations solutions of this
kind take the form of treaties. The conclu-
sion of a treaty of course gives no practical
assurance that the parties will be willing
to maintain the treaty scheme indefinitely.
In a world of sovereign nations the power
to break treaties inevitably exists, whatever
the rights of the situation, and a treaty can
be relied upon only so long as it remains
in the interest of the parties to observe it.
Nevertheless, despite its terminability in
fact, a well-drafted treaty gives better
grounds for confidence in the modus vivendi
which it reflects. Its initial acceptability to
the respective parties is indicated by their
willingness to enter into it. It defines in
agreed terms the conduct expected of them
in carrying out their joint purposes. De-
parture from its terms, besides incurring in-
ternational opprobrium, may cause other
parties to reassert their own freedom from
the treaty limits. It will therefore not be
undertaken lightly. The treaty also brings
into operation what Professor Henkin calls
a &dquo;process of education for legislation, and
education by legislation,&dquo; which generates
further co-operation (3, p. 97).
Treaties are quasi-legislative documents,
the international counterpart of the domestic
parliamentary enactment. Within the United
States they have the effect of laws. This
means that thought must be given not only
to the international legal consequences of
projected treaty provisions but also to their
impact on our own legal system. In a num-
ber of respects, therefore, the lawyer has a
large role in the treaty-making process.
The different facets of this legal role are
well illustrated by the two books here re-
viewed. As is characteristic of American
legal scholarship, they eschew abstract the-
ory. Each is a concentrated analysis of a
specific, practical problem. Both are de-
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signed to prepare the way for the drafting
of treaties on subjects high on the agenda
of urgent international business.
I
In Controls for Outer Space and the Ant-
arctic Analogy, Professors Jessup and Tau-
benfeld examine &dquo;the potentials and limita-
tions of the various alternative types of in-
ternational agreements which could be ne-
gotiated&dquo; for the internationalization of out-
er space and the Antarctic (4, p. 5).
The first part of the book is a review of
the various types of international controls
devised in the past for other areas and for
technical and administrative problems com-
parable in some degree to those confronted
in the Antarctic and in space activities. In
particular, the analysis of the regimes
drafted at one time or another for Spits-
bergen, Tangier, Danzig, the Saar, Leticia,
the Italian colonies, Trieste, and Jerusalem,
among others, is an interesting compilation
of international ingenuity in administrative
matters. The authors analyze the reasons
which have inspired co-operative solutions,
their relative advantages, and the reasons
for their failure. Particular attention is paid
to weighted voting systems. One conclusion
drawn is that &dquo;a crucial factor in the suc-
cess of a multinational administration is the
effective internationalization of the adminis-
trative personnel&dquo; (4, p. 123). The authors
note the phenomenon that governments
have been willing to treat as separable from
national political interests many aspects of
international life. They suggest that many
governments are coming to the realization
that &dquo;sovereignty itself can be divided, as
witness the supranational institutions of the
European Community and, indeed, many
provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations&dquo; (4, p. 122). They adduce no evi-
dence, however, of Russian acceptance of
this idea. This part of the book is a useful
supplement to such studies of international
administration as those of Sayre (7) and
Reinsch (6).
The second part of the book is devoted
to the situation in the Antarctic, which the
authors view as the most important testing
ground for controls for outer space. Jessup
and Taubenfeld here describe the physical
and political background for the treaty
among the twelve most interested nations
which was signed in Washington on De-
cember 1, 1959, since the publication of
their book. It was the authors’ conclusion
that, while &dquo;so long as the Antarctic re-
mains relatively uninhabited and relatively
unimportant strategically&dquo; limited function-
al arrangements in such fields as scientific
study, meteorology, whaling, and air facili-
ties might suffice, it would be &dquo;a wasted
opportunity not to experiment with a more
unified international governmental approach
which might, while favorable conditions
last, be installed successfully&dquo; (4, p. 190).
To an important degree their hope has been
fulfilled in the treaty, which places a thirty-
year moratorium on territorial claims, bans
nuclear explosions or dumping, provides for
international inspection, and sets up a com-
mittee for continued scientific research (1).
There is still the possibility of a slip, for the
treaty depends on ratification by all the
signatories, and in Argentina and Chile it
will have to buck strong sentiment for in-
clusion of the Palmer Peninsula (&dquo;Tierra
O’Higgins,&dquo; &dquo;Tierra San Martin&dquo;) in the na-
tional domain. Nevertheless, the experience
of these negotiations points the way to simi-
lar co-operation regarding outer space.
Coming to the specific legal and political
problems posed by the use of outer space,
Jessup and Taubenfeld waste little time
over the argument as to how high national
sovereignty extends. They note the general
consensus that each state has exclusive con-
trol of a belt of &dquo;airspace&dquo; comparable to
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its &dquo;territorial waters&dquo; but that, just as with
the latter, there is no precise agreement
where national airspace ends. They feel
that attempts to define this limit should be
deferred. They also conclude that no mo-
mentous decisions are needed to insure that
functional co-operation to meet technical
problems will be extended by treaty to
space activities. The serious question of po-
litical control remains. The authors indorse
the proposal of Secretary-General Ham-
marskjöld that the basis of any international
settlement should be agreement that &dquo;outer
space, and the celestial bodies therein, are
not considered as capable of appropriation
by any state&dquo; (4, p. 275). They do not dis-
cern at the present time any insurmountable
political obstacle which stands in the way
of more specific agreement on some form
of direct international administration. Agree-
ment of this kind might become more dif-
ficult at a later stage. The authors recog-
nize, however, that the crucial military as-
pect of the problem-the control of non-
peaceful uses-&dquo;is essentially part of the
problem of world peace and disarmament
rather than a peculiarity of the use of
space&dquo; (4, p. 222). They thus reach no
startling or unexpected conclusions. Their
careful and painstaking study should be of
real value, however, to the national and in-
ternational officials who are weighing the
alternative solutions for space problems.
This is a rapidly developing field and, as
in the case of Antarctica, also in regard to
the regime of outer space there has been
progress since the publication of the Jessup-
Taubenfeld book. Most important was the
unanimous adoption by the General Assem-
bly on December 12, 1959, of a resolution
which expressed agreement on the desirabil-
ity of avoiding the extension of national
rivalries into this new field, established a
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, and provided for the holding of an
international scientific conference on outer
space in 1960 or 1961.
II
In Arms Control and Inspection in Amer-
ican Law, Professor Louis Henkin examines
the legal and administrative consequences
within the United States of a system of in-
ternational arms control and inspection. He
assumes for the purpose of his study a
treaty establishing a corps of international
personnel within the United States armed
with wide powers. These include the power
to inspect government installations, private
industrial or business establishments of any
character, vehicles of every kind, hospitals
and hospital records; the power to require
reports and the keeping of records in pre-
scribed forms by all corporations or persons
engaged in activities related to armaments;
and the power to interrogate such persons,
as well as doctors, scientists, and any other
persons suspected of activities unlawful un-
der the control plan.1
The study focuses attention on the recip-
rocal nature of any arms-control plan. It
thus fills an important gap in our thinking
on the problem of arms control. As Henkin
points out, any such plan involves &dquo;a com-
promise between how much or how many
rights and powers we wish to get for in-
ternational or foreign inspectors in Russia
and how few we would like to grant such
inspectors in the United States&dquo; (3, p. 23).
It would be in basic contradiction with our
Bill of Rights, to take one example, for us
to accept a general power of search within
the United States by foreign inspectors
without search warrants. This might indi-
1 Problems of the technical feasibility of in-
spection are surveyed in a companion study, In-
spection for Disarmament, edited by Professor
Seymour Melman (5).
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cate, Henkin believes, the need &dquo;to seek
alternative forms of inspection and detec-
tion which may be equally effective without
reaching unnecessarily into the lives of a
country and its people&dquo; (3, p. 23). The re-
quirement of a search warrant issued by a
United States court might fill the bill, but
would the United States have sufficient con-
fidence in Soviet courts to give them, recip-
rocally, this control over inspection? Per-
haps the answer here is a provision for
warrants to be issued by international tri-
bunals. The question illustrates, however,
the type of problem requiring study of the
kind Henkin gives us. He analyzes the pos-
sible constitutional obstacles, the types of
implementing legislation that would be re-
quired, the need for protection against
abuses of the powers of the inspecting agen-
cy, and the problems of securing state and
local co-operation.
On certain of the issues of American con-
stitutional law raised by the assumed inter-
national inspection provisions there are fair-
ly clear answers in decided cases. In respect
to others there are no pertinent decisions,
and it is possible only to point to the con-
siderations pro and con. The skill with which
Henkin, who once served as law clerk for
both Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter and
Judge Learned Hand, discusses these issues
inspires confidence in his judgment.
He finds no problem in the limited aban-
donment of United States sovereign discre-
tion which an arms-control treaty would in-
volve. Every treaty diminishes national free-
dom of action in some degree. By and
large, the key to the problem of surmount-
ing possible constitutional obstacles is the
fact that, subject to the recognized power
of the United States government to break
the treaty, all the powers vested by the Con-
stitution in the federal government will sup-
port the authority delegated to the interna-
tional inspectorate by the treaty itself and
the necessary implementing legislation. Vis-
a-vis state and local authorities the interna-
tional inspectorate &dquo;would stand in a posi-
tion similar to that of a federal agency&dquo; (3,
p. 99 ) .
Though precise authority is lacking, one
is inclined to agree with the suggestion that
&dquo;Congress may impose inspection-a limited
regulation-on all industry as ’necessary and
proper’ to make effective the regulation of
armaments under the treaty power&dquo; (3, p.
75). Henkin adds, however, that the &dquo;rea-
sonableness&dquo; of inspection, a condition of its
validity, would be enhanced, in the view of
the courts, if it were limited as to time and
frequency.
Though treaties are subject to the limita-
tions of the Bill of Rights, these limits can
be in large part avoided if criminal prosecu-
tion of individual violators is not a primary
objective of the treaty. The privilege against
self-incrimination can thus be avoided by
the enactment of an immunity statute protect-
ing those questioned by the inspectors. The
most serious constitutional questions would
be raised by any authorization to search
individual homes without warrants, but this
also is regarded as probably unnecessary to
an effective inspection system. To authorize
the inspectors to penetrate state govern-
mental activities, the consent of the states
or a constitutional amendment might be
necessary, Henkin believes, though, once
more, there is no authoritative answer in
the cases. Possible difficult questions of the
extent of permissible delegation of the ex-
ecutive power would be avoided so long as
direct regulation (rule-making, the issuance
of orders, the granting of licenses) was re-
served to the United States government, as
distinguished from inspection of compli-
ance, which would be performed by the
international agency. With these qualifica-
tions, it is Henkin’s important over-all con-
clusion that the probable elements of an
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arms control plan &dquo;do not violate constitu-
tional limitations, nor do they seriously dis-
turb traditional concepts.... The important
obstacles to control of armaments are not in
law ...&dquo; (3, pp 153, 156).
It is indeed surprising that no analysis
of constitutional problems such as this book
makes was ever undertaken in connection
with the Baruch Plan of 1946, which en-
visaged international public ownership of
atomic industry and direct international ad-
ministration within the United States. As
Henkin notes, the lack of such analysis is
possibly an indication that there was
thought to be no serious prospect that the
plan would be adopted (3, p. 104). It is
also interesting to scrutinize in this light
the latest disarmament proposals put for-
ward by the United States (2). General
disarmament is to follow the creation of
world law enforced by a world court and
an international armed force. In contrast to
the proposals for safeguards against sur-
prise attack and the prohibition of the test-
ing of nuclear weapons, which would en-
tail no greater controls than Henkin pre-
supposes, one would suppose that there is
thought to be no serious prospect that
agreement for general disarmament will be-
come a reality. When disarmament propos-
als are accompanied by official studies of
resulting constitutional problems, and by
efforts to persuade Congress and the public
to accept them, it will be evident that our
government sees a serious possibility of
agreement.
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